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Draft Recommendation 
on the European armaments agency- reply to the 
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(i) Taking account, on the one hand, of the declaration of the member countries ofWEU annexed to 
the Treaty on European Union, which, with reference to WEU's operational role, provides inter alia for 
examination of " enhanced co-operation in the field of armaments with the aim of creating a European 
armaments agency "and, on the other hand, the Petersberg declaration which follows the same direc-
tion; 
(ii) Welcoming the decisions taken in Bonn in December 1992 by the Defence Ministers of the thirteen 
IEPG countries to transfer the functions of that group to WEU and the decisions taken at the meeting in 
Rome in May 1993 on the practical measures relating to this transfer, in particular the new name for the 
IEPG which has become the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG); 
(iii) Noting with satisfaction the report on armaments co-operation prepared by the National Armaments 
Directors and submitted for examination by the WEAG Defence Ministers meeting in Luxembourg on 
22nd November 1993; 
(iv) Similarly welcoming the creation of an ad-hoc working group for the purposes of identifying the 
tasks of a European armaments agency and determining the legal grounds on which it should be based; 
(v) Welcoming the transfer to WEU of certain activities of Eurogroup, specifically the information 
activities, EUROCOM, EUROLOG and EUROLONGTERM; 
(vi) Considering furthermore that a European armaments agency should be based on a common Euro-
pean industrial and defence policy, an integrated armaments market and a common export policy for such 
armaments; 
(vii) Noting that the ultimate objective of a common defence policy involving agreement on political 
guidelines in military and armaments matters is far from being achieved; 
( viii) Considering that in present circumstances a European armaments agency must be regarded as a 
point of departure for an undertaking that will be developed until it achieves its full capability as European 
positions converge in security and defence questions; 
(ix) Convinced nevertheless that the creation of a European armaments agency, initially with a mini-
mum of specific tasks, meets a clear need, as testified by the present dispersal of the armaments sector in 
Europe, the many bodies responsible for various co-operative programmes, the need to make the most of 
diminishing resources, to increase industrial trade, to improve and widen co-operation in the research sec-
tor and to continue work on the principles of harmonisation and standardisation including in particular 
their political, administrative and legal aspects; 
(x) Bearing in mind that the increasingly multinational composition of armed forces in Europe implies 
interoperability of military units, which must be accompanied by a firm move towards armaments 
co-operation; 
(xi) Welcoming the decision of the French and German authorities to create a joint armaments agency; 
(xii) Considering the importance of a European armaments agency in securing a competitive presence 
for Europe in the world armaments market; 
(xiii) Regretting that the Kirchberg declaration in no way tackles the question of creating a European 
armaments agency, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Have a study made for the harmonisation of the political and administrative structures of the bodies 
responsible for armaments in the WEU member countries; 
2. Examine fiscal and employment legislation governing the defence industries of the member coun-
tries, with a view to their possible harmonisation; 
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3. Inform the Assembly of the results of the report by the ad hoc working group on the tasks to be 
assigned to the European armaments agency and the legal grounds on which it should be based; 
4. Complete the integration of the armaments secretariat into the Secretariat-General in order to 
promote synergy between WEU's armaments activities and the other activities of the organisation; 
5. Strengthen the means of the armaments secretariat so that it might afford more active support to the 
work of WEAG panels and working groups; 
6. Establish forthwith a European armaments agency as a subsidiary body of the Council, initially 
tasked as follows: 
(a) management of co-operative programmes; 
(b) management of the EUCLID programme; 
(c) management of joint research and testing facilities; 
(d) technological and operational studies; 
(e) establishment of information and data services and a register of patents relating to innovation in 
the defence sector; 
(f) research into and evaluation of the world armaments market; the agency would be assisted in 
this task by industrial groups such as EDIG, which already has extensive experience in this 
sector. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Borderas, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. The Technological and Aerospace Com-
mittee has paid close attention in recent years to 
armaments questions. Mr. Wilkinson's report 
(Document 1228) on the Independent European 
Programme Group (IEPG) and Western European 
Union, the reports by Sir Dudley Smith on wea-
ponry after the Gulf war (Document 1272), arms 
and equipment for a European rapid action force 
(Document 1292), Mr. Aarts's report on arms 
export policy (Document 1305) and lastly the 
report by Mr. Lopez Henares on European arma-
ments co-operation after Maastricht (Document 
1332) are examples of a realistic approach to an 
important subject where effective and disciplined 
solutions are required. 
2. The aim of the present report is to chart the 
way forward towards establishing a European 
armaments agency as provided in the declaration 
annexed to the Treaty on European Union, in a 
practical but determined fashion, based on the 
conviction that this project represents a qualita-
tive advance of major importance for the future of 
the security and defence of Europe; also on the 
overriding need to respond realistically to the 
political, military and industrial problems caused 
by the lack of such an agency and which can only 
deteriorate further if a balanced solution is not 
found to them. 
II. Maastricht, Petersberg, Rome ... 
3. The declaration attached to the Treaty on 
European Union of the WEU member states on 
the role of Western European Union and its rela-
tions with the European Union and with the 
Atlantic Alliance, states, in the section referring to 
the operational role of WEU, that" other propo-
sals will be examined further, including enhanced 
co-operation in the field of armaments with the 
aim of creating a European armaments agency, ... " 
4. In fact, the Maastricht declaration merely 
recalls earlier declarations such as the 1984 Rome 
declaration which provides for " ... the develop-
ment of European co-operation in the field of 
armaments in respect of which WEU can provide 
a political impetus ... " or a provision in similar 
terms in the 1987 Hague platform on European 
security interests. 
5. A short time afterwards in the Petersberg 
declaration (19th June 1992) the Ministers for 
Foreign Affairs and the Defence Ministers of the 
WEU member states welcomed the decision taken 
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in Oslo on 6th March of that year by the IEPG 
defence ministers to analyse the future role of this 
group in the new European security architecture. 
The WEU Ministers took the view that this deci-
sion was a step in the direction set out at Maas-
tricht towards the future creation of a European 
armaments agency. 
6. The Petersberg declaration also included a 
proposal that WEU and IEPG experts " analyse 
this issue in depth, carry out an initial examina-
tion of the role of and functions of a possible 
European armaments agency and submit a report 
for consideration ". 
7. At their meeting in Bonn in December 
1992, the defence ministers of the thirteen IEPG 
countries agreed to transfer to WEU the functions 
which, until then, it had been carrying out. This 
was to be done in accordance with a set of basic 
principles which can be summarised as follows: 
- all IEPG members should be entitled to 
participate fully, and with the same rights 
and responsibilities, in any armaments 
co-operation forum; 
- there should be a single European arma-
ments co-operation forum in order to 
avoid any duplication; 
- the IEPG should continue to operate 
until the replacement forum becomes 
operational; 
- this body should be based initially on the 
agreed policies of the IEPG and maintain 
existing links with NATO; 
- its activities in Europe should be mana-
ged by the national armaments directors, 
who will be accountable to their defence 
ministers: 
- initially, the existing basic structure of 
the IEPG should be incorporated into the 
structure of the new body and the exis-
ting link between the IEPG and EDIG 
should be maintained. 
8. In May 1993 the defence ministers of the 
thirteen IEPG member countries, meeting in 
Rome, adopted a series of practical measures rela-
tive to the transfer of the IEPG to WEU. From 
then onwards the group has been known as the 
Western European Armaments Group (WEAG); 
additionally: 
- defence ministers will meet at least once 
a year in co-ordination with the WEU 
Council of Ministers; 
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- the chairmanship will continue to rotate 
between the thirteen members; 
- the national armaments directors will 
meet half-yearly and will constitute the 
operational level of co-operation on 
armaments questions within the frame-
work of WEAG; 
- the permanent secretariat will be trans-
ferred from Lisbon to Brussels (March 
1994); 
- relations with NATO as regards co-ope-
ration on armaments questions will 
conform to the principles agreed at 
Petersberg. 
9. The WEAG Defence Ministers meeting in 
Luxembourg on 22nd November 1993 studied the 
report on armaments co-operation by the National 
Armaments Directors (NADs) as provided for in 
the Petersberg declaration. This report was also 
submitted to the meeting of the WEU Ministerial 
Council following that of the thirteen WEAG 
ministers. 
10. Your Rapporteur is aware that this docu-
ment comprises three sections at the end of which 
the NADs recommend that the ministers approve 
a series of proposals. Thus the first of these sec-
tions on the creation of an armaments secretariat 
in Brussels recommends the closure of the perma-
nent secretariat in Lisbon on 1st April1994 and 
the creation in Brussels of an armaments secreta-
riat within the framework ofWEU, subject to cer-
tain conditions as follows: 
(a) solution to be found to the legal, admi-
nistrative and organisational issues; 
(b) the armaments secretariat to work 
under the authority of NADs in confor-
mity with the basic principles relating 
to the transfer of the IEPG functions to 
WEU; 
(c) the concept of operations, including 
tasks, to be worked out by the Staff 
Group; 
(d) armaments secretariat personnel to be 
recruited under the same conditions as 
the present WEU secretariat personnel; 
(e) the WEAG budget to be a separate 
chapter of the WEU budget, based on 
contributions from all13 nations. 
11. The integration of WEAG into WEU of 
necessity encountered a number of difficulties, 
some of which have been resolved already, while 
others are likely to be so in the near future. Until 
the present, five people worked for WEAG in Lis-
bon, paid directly by their countries of origin. The 
armaments secretariat in Brussels initially 
employed three staff, an A4 Head of Section, an 
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A2 and a B4 administrator. Staffing costs are to be 
divided by thirteen, adjusting the principles of 
budget-sharing used by WEU to WEAG's thir-
teen-strong membership. 
12. Moreover, the WEU Council will have a 
different composition when armaments issues are 
being discussed; the procedure will remain the 
same but in these particular instances thirteen 
countries will attend meetings and all will be 
entitled to vote. For their part the National Arma-
ments Directors (NADs) will be responsible for 
the armaments secretariat for the aspects that 
concern them and will keep their respective mins-
ters of defence informed. 
13. A study is currently in progress of the pos-
sible creation of one or more technical working 
groups which will be equivalent to those that exis-
ted in WEAG and Eurogroup, i.e. steering com-
mittees in direct contact with the NADs. A deci-
sion will be reached in the next few months in 
regard to their creation and number (should there 
be one or two groups, possibly composed of the 
same people?). 
14. Lastly, in the section dealing with the Euro-
pean armaments agency, the NADs had discussed 
a first report on this subject addressing possible 
tasks for such a body and governing principles. 
The NADS recognised that the conditions did not 
yet exist for the creation of an agency which 
would take over the full range of procurement 
activities on behalf of WEAG member nations 
although there might be potential in individual 
areas for more effective co-operation through a 
body having a legal personality. 
15. In the light of this first report the NADs 
agreed that further work should be undertaken to 
examine the usefulness of resorting to an agency 
in these areas against the criterion that this should 
lead to a demonstrable improvement in the 
conduct of business and to consider the legal and 
administrative arrangements for an agency and its 
relations with other bodies. 
16. The above report was the first produced by 
the ad hoc working group set up by the NADs in 
March 1993 with the aim of analysing the tasks of 
a European armaments agency and the legal basis 
on which such an agency might be created. 
17. According to the information available to 
your Rapporteur, the report is a preliminary study, 
which must be supplemented by more detailed 
research, especially on the areas of activity that 
have been identified as possible tasks for the 
agency. 
18. Having identified these areas the report 
recommends that the NADs support the conclu-
sions that it is not viable at present for a single 
agency to have responsibility for managing pro-
curement on behalf of the member countries; and 
that studies should be continued in order to ident-
ify the areas of activity that might be covered by 
such an agency. 
19. Finally, your Rapporteur feels it extremely 
useful to refer here to certain paragraphs of an 
address given by the WEU Secretary-General to 
the Royal Institute for International Relations, 
Brussels, on 2nd January 1994, on the subject of 
the present report, which reflect Mr. van Eeke-
len's consistent support for the creation of a Euro-
pean armaments agency and also constitute an 
extremely enlightening contribution to its achieve-
ment in practice: 
" Individually, WEU member states can no 
longer afford to acquire all the necessary 
assets for deterrence in Europe or force 
projection outside Europe. Co-operation is 
the only way of coping with the steady 
shrinkage in national defence budgets, 
notably in the fields of space, strategic 
transport (a memorandum of understanding 
on the feasibility study for the future large 
aircraft was signed in October 1993), logis-
tics and telecommunications. 
Work is under way to develop the open 
European defence equipment market, 
which includes guidelines and measures to 
support and increase participation of deve-
loping defence industry countries. 
Set up within WEU, the Western European 
Armaments Group (WEAG) has inherited 
the tasks of the IEPG. Denmark and two 
associate countries, Norway and Turkey, 
continue to play a full part in that frame-
work. This institutional arrangement 
should help to achieve the objective of pro-
viding political impetus for European co-
operation in the field of armaments, as reaf-
frrmed in the WEU Maastricht declaration. 
An armaments secretariat will be estab-
lished within WEU this spring. 
The creation of a European armaments 
agency is actively under study. Among the 
missions that might be assigned to this 
agency are the provision of assistance to 
the presidency of WEAG, support for the 
implementation of the EUCLID technology 
programme, further standardisation, joint 
management of test facilities, co-operative 
programmes and the creation of common 
pools of equipment. " 
20. To the above must be added, in accordance 
with the first part of the thirty-ninth annual report 
of the Council to the Assembly - Chapter IV. 
Activities of the Defence Representatives Group 
(DRG) -the approval of the Council of Ministers 
on 19th May 1993 of the transfer to WEU of cer-
tain activities of Eurogroup and specifically the 
information activities and EUROCOM. The 
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Eurogroup ministers meeting on 24th May 1993 
also approved the transfer. According to this 
report on its activities for the first half of 1993, 
discussions are continuing on the new operating 
procedures for information activities and EURO-
COM and also on the transfer of EUROLOG and 
EUROLONGTERM to WEU. 
21. In the second part of the thirty-ninth annual 
report of the Council, it can be seen that the trans-
fer of EUROCOM to WEU took effect on 1st 
August 1993, whereas that of information activi-
ties (called " Publicity activities " in this second 
part of the annual report) took effect on 1st Janu-
ary 1994, the Council's working group being res-
ponsible for these tasks. 
22. The transfer to WEU of the activities of 
EUROLOG and EUROLONGTERM also took 
effect on 1st January 1994 following a joint deci-
sion by the WEU Council and the Permanent 
Representatives of Eurogroup. The EUROLOG 
and EUROLONGTERM steering groups have 
been given new terms of reference in order to 
adapt their activities to WEU requirements. 
23. With regard to WEAG activities, in addi-
tion to the information already given, the annual 
report calls attention to the meeting of National 
Armaments Directors (NADs) held for the first 
time at WEU headquarters in Brussels on 27th 
October 1993. The WEAG panels and working 
groups pursued the following activities during the 
second half of 1993: in the framework of Panel I, 
a memorandum of understanding relating to the 
feasibility study for the future large aircraft (FLA) 
was signed by the National Armaments Directors 
of the six countries participating in this pro-
gramme: France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain 
and Turkey. 
24. The EUCLID programme has been conti-
nued in Panel 11 with a number of projects and the 
signing of contracts. At the same time, measures 
are being studied for improving the effectiveness 
of this programme. 
25. Panel m is pursuing its work on the deve-
lopment of an open defence equipment market in 
Europe and has drawn up measures to enable 
developing defence industry countries to partici-
pate more fully in that market. 
26. A question might be raised here: although 
undoubtedly progress has been achieved in inte-
grating the IEPG and Eurogroup in WEU accom-
panied by a general evolution towards closer co-
operation in armaments questions and ultimately 
towards a European armaments agency, is it not 
now time to give greater impetus to the overall 
process? By thus speeding up the process, our 
organisation would be capable of coming effecti-
vely to grips with a challenge that calls for realis-
tic and reasonable answers without delay. 
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Ill. The Standing Armaments Committee, 
Eurogroup, the IEPG 
(a) The Standing Armaments Committee 
27. The creation of a European armaments 
agency has been a long-standing item on the 
European agenda over the last forty years. The 
reluctant support given to its establishment has 
been matched by declarations of varying enthu-
siasm regarding the need for such an agency. 
28. In May 1955 the WEU Council decided on 
the creation, as a subsidiary body of that organisa-
tion, of the Standing Armaments Committee 
(SAC). Its aim was to " ... find joint solutions 
which would assist governments of member 
countries in meeting their military equipment 
requirements " by " agreements or arrangements 
on such subjects as the standardisation, produc-
tion and procurement of armaments concluded 
between all or some WEU countries ... ". This 
aim was to be achieved in close co-operation with 
NATO, with the SAC being free to set up any sub-
committees and working groups required and 
observers from NATO able to be associated with 
them. 
29. The greatest and seemingly the sole merit 
of the SAC has been that the frequent meetings of 
those responsible for armaments in the member 
countries in the framework of the SAC, NATO or, 
later on, the IEPG, have created productive rela-
tionships which have in some cases led to bi-, tri-
or multilateral co-operation programmes, even 
though no specifically WEU equipment has ever 
been produced. On 13th November 1989 the 
Council of Ministers decided to abolish the SAC. 
The question of European co-operation in arma-
ments matters remained on the agenda, however. 
(b) Eurogroup 
30. Eurogroup was formed in November 1968 
as an informal association (without official status) 
between the defence ministers of the European 
countries members of NATO. It included Bel-
gium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Turkey and the United Kingdom; its creation 
responded to the need to provide an informal body 
in which ministers might be able to hold 
exchanges of views on questions of particular 
strategic and political interest and to promote co-
operation in a concrete manner through a series of 
sub-groups. 
31. Ministerial meetings prepare the work of 
the Eurogroup staff which is composed of mem-
bers of the various delegations to NATO. 
32. Shortly after its creation, Eurogroup started 
the EDIP programme (European Defence Impro-
vement Programme) providing for joint invest-
ment in infrastructure work, the development of an 
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integrated communications network and the finan-
cing of arms procurement and transport aircraft. 
33. Where armaments are concerned, Euro-
group's activities were directed mainly (and stran-
gely) towards co-ordinating Europe's procure-
ment of American equipment. 
34. Eurogroup is sub-divided into a series of 
sub-groups as follows: EUROCOM, whose work 
has been mainly to ensure that the various natio-
nal communications systems meet previously 
fixed technical and operational conditions; 
EUROLOG, whose aim is logistic co-operation; 
EUROLONGTERM, which works on operational 
long-term doctrines; EUROMED, responsible for 
co-operation between the various health services 
of the military forces; EURONAD, whose aim is 
to reduce armaments investments through stan-
dardisation and the procurement of armaments 
and EURO/NATO training, which tries to organ-
ise training in a multinational framework. To this 
end, programme information centres have been 
set up in accordance with the duration of the 
periods of instruction. 
35. From the very outset, the fact that France 
did not belong to Eurogroup made it difficult to 
find common solutions for the European members 
of NATO. It is indeed difficult to promote co-ope-
ration in a practical manner without a country 
such as France whose technological, industrial 
and commercial level in armaments is surpassed 
in the alliance only by that of the United States. 
(c) The IEPG 
36. The Independent European Programme 
Group (IEPG) was created on 2nd February 1976. 
It is a co-operative structure grouping the thirteen 
European countries of the Atlantic Alliance, with 
the exception of Iceland. Its work is shared mainly 
between three panels. Panel I deals with operatio-
nal requirements and equipment programmes, 
Panel II, the most recent one, deals with research 
and technology, EUCLID being its main activity, 
and Panel m deals with procedural and economic 
questions. 
37. The ministers or secretaries of state meet 
every nine months and take decisions if they have 
been well-enough prepared. The National Arma-
ments Directors (NADs) meet once or twice bet-
ween ministerial meetings. 
38. The European defence industries have 
organised themselves to meet with the IEPG. This 
is the European Defence Industrial Group (EDIG) 
which has the backing of the national professional 
organisations. EDIG has a structure similar to that 
of the IEPG, i.e. with Panels I, II and m. 
39. The IEPG's first eight years passed without 
significant results. During that time, the group 
mainly tried to harmonise timetables and replace-
ment plans for the defence equipment of the mem-
ber countries with a view to promoting co-opera-
tive programmes. 
40. In 1984, the rather meagre results of the 
IEPG urged Europeans to try to revive it by gui-
ding its action towards the promotion of co-opera-
tion in technological research in armaments mat-
ters. This was the purpose of the EUCLID pro-
gramme launched on 29th June 1989 (European 
co-operation for the long term in defence) which 
has sometimes been called" military Eureka". Its 
aim was to co-ordinate and rationalise the efforts 
of the armaments industries and make them co-
operate in advance technology. To come to grips 
with the many difficulties, a list of eleven joint 
priority areas for Europe was drawn up (CEPA: 
common European priority areas) with a pilot 
country for each one. In each of these areas, a 
group of officials of the countries concerned met 
to identify and define the projects likely to interest 
several countries and to fix their limits. Once pro-
jects are outlined, they are submitted to the appro-
priate authorities of each country who decide 
whether or not to earmark the necessary financing 
for a given project. This procedure is necessary 
since it has not been possible, at the present junc-
ture in European defence co-operation, to define 
the budgets to be allocated to the various CEPAs. 
41. However this may be, the EUCLID pro-
gramme is now running smoothly and the idea has 
developed in parallel to pursue European co-ope-
ration in armaments questions in a firmer, more 
visible framework, such as WEU. 
IV. The future European armaments agency 
42. Clearly, as matters now stand, a European 
armaments agency in the broadest sense of the 
word covering the full range of such an agency 
would not yet be a viable proposition. 
43. The European armaments agency should be 
based on a complementary and co-ordinated 
policy resulting from agreement among defence 
industries on an integrated armaments market and 
a common export policy for such armaments. The 
present European juncture is hardly promising in 
this respect. 
44. The common foreign and security policy 
(CFSP) is almost inexistent and a common defence 
policy is still far away. What hope could there 
then be for a joint armaments and military policy? 
45. In the short and medium term, one cannot 
expect to create a European armaments agency 
with wide-ranging responsibilities; on the con-
trary, if starting positions are neither reasonable 
nor achievable, this project might well come to 
grief and it would be difficult to find the necess-
ary consensus to launch that body. It would appear 
necessary however to begin work on the most 
important aspects of its probable infrastructure: 
9 
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definition, basic budgetary requirements, equip-
ment and human resource requirements, pro-
grammes, production, trade and exports. 
46. This being so, one principle should be affir-
med: while the usefulness of an agency has 
always been generally recognised, the political 
and economic circumstances which now prevail 
in Europe make it more necessary than ever, 
although paradoxically these very circumstances 
exacerbate the prejudices of certain states (on the 
part of the government, the national defence 
industry, public opinion, or all these sectors toge-
ther) towards its creation. 
47. Before listing the tasks that might be 
entrusted to the European armaments agency, 
brief mention should be made of a few of the dif-
ficulties to be encountered at the very start, some 
of which will be developed further in subsequent 
chapters. First are the different politico-adminis-
trative structures of the bodies responsible for 
armaments in the various member countries. 
These bodies are of differing types, particularly 
with regard to their areas of responsibility, procu-
rement, exports, research establishments or tes-
ting sites and procedures applicable for planning 
and starting armaments programmes. 
48. Moreover, other factors affect the defence 
industries of member countries and make their 
position uncertain. Legislation governing patents, 
working conditions and the various fiscal systems 
affecting these industries vary from one country 
to another. 
49. Better harmonisation in these areas would 
make relations between the national bodies more 
flexible and consequently more fruitful; it would 
facilitate co-operation and would help to maintain 
a balance between national defence industries and 
in the end would improve the discipline and effec-
tiveness of the future agency. 
50. Harmonisation should not necessarily have 
priority over the creation of the agency but should 
be pursued in parallel with the latter's first steps. 
51. There is a clear need to create an agency as 
testified by the considerable dispersal of arma-
ments matters in Europe today, the presence of an 
agency or an armaments organisation in each 
country, the existence of many bodies responsible 
for various co-operative programmes, the need to 
use the funds available to better avail, to centralise 
present arrangements around programmes and to 
tighten up industrial co-operation, and co-ordinate 
major investment; nor must one forget the deve-
lopment sector, the improvement and enlargement 
of co-operation in research with due respect for the 
principles of harmonisation and standardisation 
(particularly from the legal point of view). 
52. A whole series of initiatives should be 
taken to meet the challenge of the European 
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Union in armaments matters: by resolving exis-
ting problems and difficulties, Europe would 
prove itself to be equal to its requirements, its 
possibilities and would take a competitive posi-
tion on the world scene. 
53. The tasks identified for the agency should 
be kept to a minimum to allow it to operate effec-
tively and make it an efficient tool that would 
open the way for its subsequent development. 
54. The missions entrusted to the agency 
should not be undertaken simultaneously but 
should correspond to roles to be achieved in the 
medium term with an appropriate timetable in 
each case. It should be made clear that the first 
role of the agency is to offer a simple flexible 
structure which would firmly promote co-opera-
tion in different programmes, avoiding at all costs 
the formation of a bureaucratic straitjacket. 
55. Possible tasks for the agency initially might 
be: 
(a) management of co-operative pro-
grammes; 
(b) management of the EUCLID pro-
gramme; 
(c) management of joint research and 
testing facilities; 
(d) technological and operational studies; 
(e) establishment of information and data 
services. 
(a) Management of co-operative programmes 
56. In recent years, a whole series of co-opera-
tive programmes has been started. These bi-, tri-
or multilateral programmes have been achieved 
thanks to a general political process of co-opera-
tion without which they could not have been 
continued. 
57. Experience shows that without a true long-
term political commitment and effective confi-
dence with political backing the plan will even-
tually fail. Again, the multiplication of costs due 
to the participation of a very high number of 
countries also leads to failure. Many examples 
may be quoted in support of this affirmation, 
including that of the fust frigate of the nineties. 
58. To succeed a co-operative programme, one 
must take the view that it is not a joint programme 
but a common programme, guided by a strategy 
for the whole programme with a firm political and 
financial commitment which must, of course, be 
based on the requirements expressed by defence 
staffs. 
59. A first aim of these programmes is to allow 
savings to be made: it is therefore necessary to 
respect the principle of the long-term commit-
ment, the need for the programme to be a common 
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one, avoiding variations insofar as possible, and 
fair work- and cost-sharing. 
60. The choice of the industrial consortium 
must first be made in accordance with criteria of 
efficiency and next allow a global handling of the 
problem of industrial return. The political will to 
use European equipment must be a goal to be 
attained, even if, be it only in the short term, this 
is not a sine qua non. Co-operation must be based 
on the fact that in industrial matters each country 
must do what it is best placed to handle and a 
country's inordinate industrial ambition may jeo-
pardise the profitability of co-operation. 
61. This being so, what might be the contribu-
tion of the European armaments agency to co-
operative programmes? First, it would provide a 
juridical basis. At the present time, offices respon-
sible for co-operative programmes may work 
under the wing of NATO agencies or international 
project offices (IPOs). These offices have no legal 
status and any work they wish to pursue to its 
conclusion has to be achieved in conformity with 
the laws and standards of the host country. For 
example, they themselves cannot draw up 
contracts or grant employees a juridical status. 
62. The agency would fust offer an appropriate 
juridical framework for working effectively and at 
a high level. It would co-ordinate the execution of 
co-operative programmes. In this respect it would 
play the rOle of board of directors on which all the 
countries would be represented and which would 
have its own rules of procedure with an intelligent 
approach to present regulations and able to 
operate a la carte. 
63. The agency would endeavour to rearrange 
present systems taking programmes into account, 
tighten up industrial co-operation, avoid the dis-
persal of co-operative programmes and all in all, 
make better use of available funds. 
64. Furthermore, the European armaments 
agency might offer the various co-operative pro-
grammes a series of services, particularly through 
the creation of a data bank covering such ques-
tions as the pros and cons of various procedures, 
intellectual property rights, regulations governing 
contracts (commercial law, rules for industrial 
association), VAT, etc. 
(b) Management of the EUCliD programme 
65. The EUCLID programme mentioned ear-
lier is a good example of how being used to wor-
king together is a very great help when everyone 
agrees on principles but not on the methods of 
work. An additional advantage of EUCLID is that 
it proves that Europe has the ability to join the 
competition even if the research effort of the thir-
teen member countries of the programme repre-
sents about half of the effort made by the United 
States. 
66. The machinery for operating the EUCLID 
programme is complicated and it is clearly not 
easy for thirteen countries to work together, yet its 
present achievements can be considered as posi-
tive. At present there are 43 programmes which 
imply state financing amounting to some 280 mil-
lion ecus and 22 co-operative contracts have 
already been signed. 
67. According to the information available to 
your Rapporteur, however, the programme is 
encountering three major obstacles. First, it is 
very time-consuming. Thirteen-power co-opera-
tion involves considerable delays at national level 
due to the need for approval of the authorities of 
each country, legal, industrial problems, etc. 
Second, new proposals are lacking. From this 
point of view, some sectors are better than others. 
This lack of new proposals is linked to a third obs-
tacle: the existence of hi-, tri- or multilateral pro-
grammes often make some countries prefer this 
type of framework to that of EUCLID. 
68. Panel II has drawn a number of conclusions 
from what has been said above: a permanent 
structure is needed to overcome the problems lis-
ted. In this respect the creation of a European 
armaments agency would help EUCLID's work to 
advance in a more satisfactory manner. Further-
more, the panel has raised the idea of creating a 
research cell which in a way would be a vanguard 
of the agency. It would help to motivate the indus-
tries which often lose interest in EUCLID because 
of the obstacles they encounter and which have 
already been mentioned. This cell would be a 
driving force for all the groups which depend on 
the programme and would be quite small, thus 
ensuring its profitability. These initiatives would 
help to put an end to delays and would make 
procedures more flexible. 
69. At present, France and the United Kingdom 
devote some 1% of their research budgets to the 
EUCLID programme, Germany 2% and the other 
countries between 5 and 50%. The total defence 
research budget in the thirteen countries of the 
Western European Armaments Group amounts to 
some F 18 000 million compared to F 42 000 mil-
lion for the United States. 
70. The management of EUCLID by the 
agency would avoid wasting our resources and, 
through rationalisation, it would at least be pos-
sible to avoid widening the gap between Europe 
and the United States. 
(c) Management of joint research and testing 
establishments 
71. The prevailing situation in this area calls 
for joint and global solutions due mainly to the 
cost and space involved in these activities; such 
solutions are more necessary than ever at a time 
when budgets everywhere are being sharply cur-
tailed. Since it is impossible to improve condi-
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tions for co-operation in this sector, a European 
armaments agency would first offer a juridical 
framework fqr these establishments which might 
thus be managed jointly offering the possibility of 
immediate benefits from the savings stemming 
from an efficient and rational use of these installa-
tions. 
(d) Operational and technological research 
72. Mention has already been made of the 
many efforts in recent years (Standing Arma-
ments Committee, Eurogroup, IEPG) to promote 
inter alia the goal of harmonising military specifi-
cations although little significant progress has yet 
been made. Short- and medium-term prospects in 
this matter are hardly optimistic but there is a 
clear need to move forward in this sector. At pre-
sent there is a trend towards an overall definition 
of forces such as the future Franco-Italian-
Spanish maritime group which implies that these 
units are interoperable and hence have close links 
with the Planning Cell. Being multinational, such 
forces will give considerable impetus to co-opera-
tion in armaments matters. 
73. One should not try to conceal the difficul-
ties a research group might encounter in this sec-
tor, nor should they prevent steady relentless pro-
gress in identifying the possibilities of agreement. 
(e) Creation of an information and data service 
74. In paragraph 64 on co-operative pro-
grammes, mention was already made of a number 
of services that a European armaments agency 
might offer its members in regard to information; 
this service should be capable of providing speci-
fic and accurate information and data regarding 
the market for defence items extending from 
defence expenditure to the description of the 
defence industry, including exports and imports of 
such equipment in regard to the member countries 
and their transatlantic links; it should also keep a 
register of patents together with all relevant infor-
mation. 
75. Such data already exist although clearly 
they can be improved. In fact, most members of 
the WEAG publish periodically information bul-
letins on the procurement needs of the various 
contracting bodies and a report on the firms obtai-
ning contracts. The question is to obtain fuller 
information about the above sectors and from this 
information to build up a data bank which will be 
available to the member countries. 
76. Mention has already been made of the main 
tasks that might initially be entrusted to the agency 
but clearly a more detailed study is necessary in 
order to define these tasks more accurately and 
establish operating rules that are flexible enough 
to escape from burdensome and delaying bureau-
cratic structures. 
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77. The legal bases for creating this agency are to 
be found in the modified Brussels Treaty which pro-
vides for the possibility of the Council setting up 
subsidiary bodies. Participation in this future subsi-
diary body by WEU associate members and obser-
vers should raise no legal or political difficulties. 
78. The fact that the agency may be able to 
undertake some tasks considered to be common 
tasks and others that would come under different 
co-operative programmes between certain coun-
tries does not seem to be a major obstacle. 
79. Concerning the agency's relations with the 
European Union and NATO, the Treaty on 
European Union and the appended declaration of 
the WEU member countries together with subse-
quent declarations and more recently the declara-
tions issued at the NATO summit meeting in 
January of this year, and also the explicit backing 
of the United States for the common foreign and 
security policy and the European security identity 
illustrate the role assigned to each of these organi-
sations (WEU, European Union and NATO), their 
present relationship and the level of these links. 
80. Furthermore, as far as your Rapporteur can 
see, the member countries of WEU and the WEAG 
are not trying for the time being to change their rela-
tionship with the European Commission at the ins-
titutional level nor at the level of defence industries. 
V. The Franco-German armaments agency 
81. At the Franco-German summit meeting in 
Bonn at the beginning of December 1993, the 
Defence Ministers, Mr. Leotard and Mr. Riihe, 
decided to create a joint armaments agency. 
82. According to the information at your Rap-
porteur's disposal, this agency would have the 
task of managing bilateral armaments pro-
grammes with a view to improving the efficiency 
of these programmes and reducing management 
costs. There is now a joint office that manages all 
bilateral programmes, although each country still 
has its own national office to verify the work of 
the joint office. 
83. The Franco-German agency would create a 
single management office which would replace 
the national offices and consequently save money 
and increase management efficiency. 
84. The initial intention is that at the middle of 
this year those responsible for equipment procure-
ment should make a series of specific proposals 
for starting the agency so that the latter might start 
its work immediately, but the date of 1995 now 
seems more realistic. 
85. Current bilateral programmes include the 
Tiger attack helicopter, the Roland, Milan and Hot 
Euromissiles and, with the United Kingdom, the 
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Trigat anti-tank missile programme. Furthermore, 
the agency would be given the new development 
programme for the next generation of 
wheeled combat vehicles. 
86. The defence ministers have agreed that 
work should be started on the standardisation of 
equipment for the European corps. 
87. Apparently two solutions are being studied 
for the legal framework in which the agency 
should be set. The first would be for a treaty bet-
ween the two countries - this would make parlia-
mentary ratification compulsory. The problem 
with this solution is that Germany is at present in 
the midst of an electoral period, in particular 
general elections which are to be held on 16th 
October 1994: there is therefore little hope of the 
parliamentary process being completed in the 
coming months. The alternative would be to make 
the Franco-German agency a subsidiary organ of 
the Council which your Rapporteur believes would 
raise juridical difficulties and political problems. 
88. This solution would raise a number of 
questions: how could a subsidiary body be created 
that would not be open to the participation of all 
the member states? Moreover, the Council would 
maintain control over a body composed solely of 
two of its member states. Since this is merely a 
hypothesis, the matter will not be taken further. 
89. Again, there is every indication that this 
agency is not intended to be the initial nucleus of 
the future European armaments agency but, one 
way or another, it is to stimulate the creation and 
development of the latter by following a parallel 
course and preserving its bilateral character, 
although exceptionally it is open to Belgium, in 
order to be integrated sooner or later in the Euro-
pean armaments agency which, in principle, 
would not be before the year 2000. 
90. Finally, it should be noted that the agency 
would have its own market code, with the possibi-
lity of following the example of NATO in this res-
pect and in any case excluding community law 
since defence equipment cannot be compared 
with any other. It is crystal-clear that if the Franco-
German proposal materialises it will indeed be a 
stimulus of the greatest importance for all the ini-
tiatives of the European armaments agency. 
VI. The European Defence Industries Group 
(EDIG) 
91. The European Defence Industries Group 
was created in 1990 by the national associations 
of defence industries of the member countries of 
what was then the IEPG. EDIG represents the 
interests of the European defence industry and 
maintains a close working relationship with the 
governments of the WEAG countries. 
92. EDIG has a board of directors, a technical 
committee and an economic and legal committee. 
EDIG is a source of information of very high stan-
dard and therefore of very great interest. This body 
seeks Europe-wide responsibilities which, accor-
ding to its representatives, implies a joint industrial 
policy. EDIG believes standardisation is necessary 
from the military point of view whereas in indus-
trial terms a co-operative structure is needed; initia-
tives to promote co-operation should come from 
both industrial and governmental circles. 
93. Similarly, EDIG considers it would be desi-
rable to move more quickly in this sector and lea-
ders of industry generally take a favourable view 
of the creation of a European armaments agency. 
94. Basing itself on Article 223 of the treaty 
instituting the European Community 1, EDIG 
emphasises the need for it to remain in existence 
mainly in order to avoid the risks from abroad that 
would follow its disappearance, with particular 
regard to the United States. It is appropriate to 
refer here to the discriminatory practices and 
measures applied by the United States in the 
defence sector for the purposes of protecting and 
promoting its own interests through support for its 
defence industry and particularly by facilitating 
exports. It might further be noted that the Euro-
pean Commission is now preparing a Community 
regulation on armaments exports to third coun-
tries. With regard to dual-use items and the sys-
tem regulating them, work is now being conduc-
ted on lists of items; the appropriate legal regula-
tions still have to be defined. As regards exports 
of conventional defence equipment, the document 
prepared by EDIG appended to the present report 
is of major interest and puts forward a highly 
interesting view that is representative of the Euro-
pean defence industry and, in your Rapporteur's 
opinion, very much to the point. The document 
deals mainly with export controls in co-operation 
projects and underlines the need for governments, 
in conjunction with industry, to establish standard 
measures and procedures relating to the exporta-
tion of defence equipment. 
I. Article 223: I. The provisions of this treaty shall not pre-
clude the application of the following rules: (a) No member 
state shall be obliged to supply information the disclosure of 
which it considers contrary to the essential interests of its 
security; (b) Any member state may take such measures as it 
considers necessary for the protection of the essential inter-
ests of its security which are connected with the production 
of or trade in arms, munitions and war material; such mea-
sures shall not, however, adversely affect the conditions of 
competition in the common market regarding products which 
are not intended for specifically military purposes. 
2. During the first year after the entry into force of this treaty, 
the Council shall, acting unanimously, draw up a list of 
products to which the provisions of paragraph 1 (b) shall 
apply. 
3. The Council may, acting unanimously on a proposal from 
the Commission, make changes in this list. 
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95. The report by Mr. Aarts on arms export 
policy (Document 1305) contains the following 
considerations: 
" 145. The continuing reluctance of the 
WEU Council to debate the problems of 
armaments transfers due to the fact that 
most member governments envisage a 
greater role for the European Community 
and the future European Union in these 
matters must be overcome because of the 
obvious implications for the essential secu-
rity and defence interests of member coun-
tries. The crucial problems standing in the 
way of a harmonised arms export policy 
must be resolved in WEU and not in the 
framework of European political co-opera-
tion. " 
In the opinion of your Rapporteur these conside-
rations are still highly relevant today. It is there-
fore WEU, taking account of sectoral interests 
and common European policy, that remains the 
competent organisation in an area that is absolut-
ely crucial to the security and defence of Europe. 
96. Apart from the position adopted by EDIG 
for the creation of the agency, some countries 
have made public their position on the need to 
create a defence Europe which, for industry, is 
both a need and a chance, according to the 
defence white paper published by the French 
Ministry of Defence in 1994. 
97. According to this white paper, with which 
EDIG generally agrees, no future major conven-
tional armaments programme seems able to 
escape from the logic of co-operation. Political 
co-operation has already paved the way towards 
co-operation on programmes at a time when this 
was becoming an economic necessity; furthermore, 
this policy also supposes that the European states 
demonstrate their solidarity by showing their pre-
ference for Europe. Again, without a common 
strategy, the decline of the European armaments 
industry will be started and the independence of 
Europe called into question. 
98. Still according to the white paper, the IEPG 
integrated in WEU and the European armaments 
agency provided for in the declaration appended 
to the Treaty on European Union offer possible 
frameworks for this policy. For his part, Mr. Tony 
Pry or, British Chairman of the Defence Manufac-
turers' Association, speaking at a conference 
organised by GICAT in Paris on 26th October 
1993, voiced the idea that EDIG would become 
the main centre for grouping the defence industry 
vis-a-vis WEU and any future European arma-
ments agency. He also said that British represen-
tatives of the defence industry were far from 
convinced that Europe offered the only way out. 
99. The fact is that there is not unanimity 
regarding the agency or its responsibilities in 
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industrial circles, nor in political circles. There are 
even sectors that give the impression that they 
want this body to come into existence whereas in 
reality they are not at all prepared to transfer some 
of their national responsibilities to such an inter-
national organisation. As has so often been repea-
ted in this report, it will be necessary to start with 
the smallest common denominator. 
100. Finally in this chapter, your Rapporteur 
wishes to take up a consideration discussed in a 
publication of the French Commissariat general 
du Plan, the future of defence-related industries 
which, referring to the creation of a European 
armaments agency, stated that it would be neces-
sary to avoid a dogmatic approach which might 
prevent the formation in Europe of alliances of a 
small group of partners with homogenous respon-
sibilities for certain research or certain pro-
grammes within the agency or outside it when its 
framework did not offer the best solution. 
101. Your Rapporteur agrees entirely with this 
warning and is convinced that the European agency 
should in no case limit or prevent co-operation 
that might prove to be more convenient or more 
fruitful outside its framework for a specific pro-
gramme. It should not be forgotten that industry 
has always been ahead of political necessities and 
that co-operation has always been more satisfac-
tory and more rapid from the industrial point of 
view than from the governmental point of view. 
VII. Conclusions 
102. As emerges clearly from the previous 
pages, your Rapporteur strongly advocates the 
creation of a European armaments agency as a 
subsidiary body of WEU with a narrow but realis-
tic range of activities which would be limited to 
the minimum accepted by all participants. Its 
structure would be a simple one but after proving 
its efficiency and usefulness as it develops it 
would provide the foundation for wider responsi-
bilities in the future. It is quite certain that the 
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time is not yet ripe for the creation of a European 
armaments agency in the broadest sense as explai-
ned in Chapter N, but at the present time pressure 
must be brought to bear to obtain a convergence in 
the political, military and technical fields and, to 
this end, the creation of the agency is a useful and 
necessary initiative that can be achieved in the 
manner described above. 
103. The process started by the introduction of 
the agency will contribute to the advancement of 
the integration of defence policy in general and 
should be accompanied by a similar process in the 
armed forces concerned; without technical co-
operation, military co-operation is not possible. 
104. Your Rapporteur believes that the tasks 
assigned to the agency, at least during the initial 
running-in period, can be accepted by all the 
WEAG countries and the creation of this body as 
described in the present report should raise no 
objections in the various countries since there can 
be no threat to their national interests. 
105. It matters little that some may feel that an 
agency with such responsibilities is not worthy of 
the name. It hardly matters that the agency should 
take over the duties of WEU armaments secreta-
riat or that it should be the secretariat itself that 
carries out the tasks of the agency, as they have 
been described, without it being necessary to 
create it officially. 
106. Before the end of the present year, the 
WEU Council of Ministers should take a decision 
on this matter. Co-operation in armaments ques-
tions is an essential dimension of our organisation 
and to take a first, albeit it small, step in this direc-
tion will eventually provide us with a framework 
which is absolutely necessary for the future policy 
of common defence. Without this framework, 
who could honestly define WEU's raison d'etre in 
the European Union or imagine the future of this 
Union? 
107. In this undertaking, the Council can count 
on the firm and vigilant support of the Assembly. 
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APPENDIX 
Document on EDIG's policy on conventional defence equipment exports 
1. Introduction 
1.1 In considering the question of defence 
equipment exports it is of prime importance to 
remember that these matters are an integral part of 
government policy, defence and foreign, and that 
normal commercial solutions to problems will not 
always be appropriate. This assumption involves 
considerable problems since it has an immediate 
impact on one of the basic operating assumptions 
for defence industry, that of long-term investment 
policy. At the present time, this impact is even 
more significant than hitherto since, with reducing 
defence budgets and increasing technology costs, 
it is highly unlikely that any single nation will be 
able to contemplate the research and development 
and production costs of a major item of defence 
equipment. Pan-European projects will become 
the norm and even then it is possible that the Euro-
pean " home market " alone will be insufficient to 
support their existence. Thus collaboration and co-
operation will become commonplace and accepted 
standards of exports policy will become vitally 
important in the formation of future collaborative 
partnerships. It would be difficult, if not impos-
sible, for a major company to contemplate colla-
boration with another company unless that com-
pany exists in a country where the government has 
accepted common principles of exporting policy. 
An absence of national government agreement 
could therefore mean that its national industry 
would find itself effectively debarred from partici-
pation in collaborative projects. 
1.2. The overall future aim of industry is that a 
common European policy on defence equipment 
exports be developed which does not impede 
international co-operation and which takes into 
account the need to strengthen the European posi-
tion in defence equipment production. However 
an intergovernmental agreement on a long-term 
harmonised framework of defence export proce-
dures and regulations is unlikely to be practicable 
before the acceptance of a common foreign and 
security policy amongst the member nations of 
WEU/EEC and even in the most optimistic scena-
rio this may take some years. 
In the meantime, the European defence 
industry needs some interim arrangements if it is 
to survive and to develop into a strong and more 
competitive industry in the world marketplace. 
The main problem for industry is how it will bridge 
the gap in time between industrial survival and the 
full implementation of political decisions. 
Governments should neither act in a way that 
constrains the export of defence goods from 
nations willing to export them nor in a way that 
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disadvantages their home-based suppliers from 
taking part in co-operative programmes. 
2. Export regulations in co-operative projects 
2.1. It is suggested that there will be three main 
types of international business activity in the 
defence equipment field of the future: 
(a) joint venture projects on a government-
to-government basis, i.e. initiated by 
governments and subject to agreed 
government-to-government MOU s. 
They will include elements of design, 
development and production; 
(b) joint venture projects on a company-to-
company basis with no official govern-
ment involvement. These also will 
include elements of design, develop-
ment and production; 
(c) company-based initiatives which rely 
on collaboration at the sub-contractor 
level in the production phase only. 
2.2. To develop these examples one by one: 
(a) Joint venture projects on a government-to-
government basis 
It is most unlikely that any formal govern-
ment-to-government agreement will be reached 
without the question of exporting policy being dis-
cussed. However, industry should emphasise to 
governments the importance of this matter being 
properly resolved during the negotiations leading 
up to any agreement on a project-based MOU. 
It would also be appropriate for the regula-
tions and procedures applicable to the movement 
and export of defence equipment to be relaxed 
when this activity takes place under the umbrella 
of an intergovernment MOU. For example, that in 
such circumstances the approval of only one 
government authority may be adequate. 
(b) Joint venture projects on a company-to-com-
pany basis 
In this case, industry requires some form of 
assurance regarding the policies of the govern-
ments of the companies involved before it enters 
into contractual agreements and financial com-
mitments to develop and produce for sale a defence 
equipment system. Competitive pressures for cost 
reductions by single sourcing of components and 
spares will demand some form of government 
advice at a relatively early stage of inter-company 
discussions. Sooner or later any successful defence 
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equipment project of any size will be the subject 
of a possible export order. In fact, as already sta-
ted in paragraph 1.1. above, the time may not be 
too far off when even a pan-European defence 
industry cannot contemplate the development and 
production of a major defence equipment project 
without the support of a market outside WEU and 
the EEC. Companies will require to consult with 
governments on a case-by-case basis to establish 
what the official policy on export approval is likely 
to be. Whilst even on a case-by-case basis it is 
unlikely that governments will be prepared to give 
long-term approval at this time they should be 
prepared to give adequate warnings of the proba-
bility of export embargo decisions in the future. 
Once again, in this type of activity it is hoped 
that once government "agreement to proceed" is 
received, less onerous procedures for obtaining the 
necessary export licences might be available. 
(c) Company-based initiatives 
The increasing tendency of governments to 
have official national research and development 
policies which forecast programmes of national 
research and development activity with only limi-
ted opportunities for even prototype production to 
follow, will make it of prime importance that com-
panies obtain government reassurance that long-
term export potential can be realised. Without such 
assurances at an early stage in the development 
phase, and in the absence of a guaranteed home 
market, it is unlikely that companies, even those 
which are to some degree state-owned, will ven-
ture their own capital and this can only lead to a 
further weakening of the industrial base. 
In this particular case, it would also be 
beneficial if governments would accept that it 
would be the export regulations of the country in 
which the prime or lead contractor was resident 
which would form the basis of the operating rules 
for that particular project. Wide government 
agreement to such a principle would mean that 
prime and lead contractors would be free to range 
across all of the countries of WEU in a compe-
titive search for subcontractors, thus preparing the 
way for a final product which could be compe-
titive in the world marketplace. 
APPENDIX 
3. Conclusions and recommendations 
3.1. In the short term, arrangements between 
member nations will be just as vital for govern-
ment-to-government co-operation as for industry-
to-industry co-operation. In both cases, the prin-
ciple should be that, while the government of the 
intending exporting state should consult other 
governments whose industries are involved in the 
joint venture before making any fmal decision, it 
must be accepted that governments may not debar 
companies in their own state involved in the joint 
venture from meeting their contractual obliga-
tions. Without an agreement of this nature, it will 
be impossible to maintain the efficient defence 
co-operation structure in Europe which is increa-
singly necessary in the wake of falling national 
demand. 
3.2. Should governments decide to work 
towards the establishment of standard regulations 
and procedures for the export of defence equip-
ment, industry should take a very positive interest 
in the negotiations and the following recommen-
dations are made accordingly: 
(a) that for defence equipment produced 
in co-operation with another WEU 
member state, i.e. government-to-
government, the principles covering 
export authority should be firmly sta-
ted in the MOU associated with the co-
operation agreement and that relaxed 
administrative procedures should be 
defined; 
(b) that for defence equipment produced 
on a company-to-company basis bet-
ween companies situated in two or 
more WEU states, member states 
should not, in normal circumstances, 
withhold export approval for the sup-
ply of component parts between mem-
bers of the industrial consortium invol-
ved and that agreed relaxed administra-
tive procedures may be applied; 
(c) that the supply of component parts for 
defence equipment within WEU and 
Cocom should be unrestricted. 
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